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We show that increasing the probability of obtaining a job offer through a network should raise the
observed wages of workers in jobs found through formal channels relative to those in jobs found through
the network. This prediction holds at all percentiles except the highest and lowest. The largest changes
are likely to occur below the median of the offer distribution. We test and confirm these implications
using a survey of recent immigrants into Canada. We develop a simple structural model consistent
with the theoretical model and show that it can replicate the broad patterns in the data. Our results
are consistent with the primary effect of network strength being to increase the arrival rate of offers
rather than to alter the distribution from which offers are drawn at least among recent immigrants.
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While it is plausible that networks play an important role in the labor market assimilation of im-
migrants, there is little compelling evidence that they play a positive role and even less about the
mechanisms by which networks affect the labor market outcomes of immigrants. In this paper we
use a very different approach from those found in the literature. We develop a simple theoretical
model of the role of networks, test its comparative static properties and estimate a simple structural
version of our model. Our results are consistent with the principal effect of strong networks for
recent immigrants being to increase the arrival rate of offers rather than to change the distribution
from which offers are drawn.
We build on Montgomery (1992) who shows that among workers whose network is stronger
than formal channels are (in other words whose network provides a greater probability of an offer
than do formal channels), those who ￿nd a job through the network should have lower wages than
those who ￿nd a job through formal channels. We show that this wage differential is increasing
in absolute value in network strength and that the increase occurs at all percentiles of the wage
distribution except the highest and lowest. We provide an intuitive argument that the effect is
likely to be largest at percentiles below the median of the offer distribution.
To test this prediction, we hypothesize that the probability of ￿nding a job through the network
is higher if the immigrant has strong ties to someone near whom he lives. Therefore, we capture
network strength by the presence of at least one relative or close friend in the recent immigrant’s
area of residence in Canada at the time of arrival.1 We ￿nd that a stronger network helps a recent
immigrant ￿nd his ￿rst job through his social network and some evidence that it raises wages,
at least at lower quantiles. We test the implication of the theoretical model by examining the
interactionbetweennetworkstrengthandjob￿ndingmethod. Thepredictednegativecoef￿cienton
the interaction term is con￿rmed for jobs towards the lower end of the observed wage distribution.
At this end of his wage distribution, ￿nding a network job is associated with higher wages for those
with weak networks, and the interaction between network strength and ￿nding a job through the
network is negative.
The larger coef￿cient on the interaction term at lower quantiles is an expected result based
on the theoretical model. However, the theory gives little guidance as to plausible magnitudes.
Are the effects we ￿nd too large or too small to be consistent with a plausible speci￿cation of the
theoretical model? To address this question, we estimate a very simple structural model in which
wages are drawn from two log normal distributions, one for formal jobs and one for network jobs,
1It is important that the recent immigrant is asked about the presence of a strong social tie in his neighborhood, just
upon arrival. This makes network strength exogenous to his subsequent labor market experience.
1and ask whether the model can produce parameters that are comparable to those we ￿nd in the
data. In fact, the model does a reasonable job of ￿tting the parameters, suggesting that a model in
which the primary role of strong network ties is to increase the ￿ow of job offers, rather than to
change the wage distribution from which offers are drawn, is consistent with the data.
In contrast with our emphasis on network strength, the literature on the relation between social
networks and immigrants’ labor market outcomes has focused on the effects of living in ethnic
enclaves or in areas with large numbers of immigrants from their home country. Thus, this litera-
ture is concerned with network size. There are many reasons why network size may be important.
Employers within an enclave may prefer to hire individuals from their own country (Borjas 2000).
By employing their compatriots, they reduce frictions at work arising from differences in lan-
guage and work habits. Such employees may also better understand the tastes of consumers in
the enclave, helping the ￿rm serve its market more effectively. On the other hand, by providing
jobs targeted towards its members and steering them into certain occupations, enclaves may limit
their search horizons. They could therefore preclude jobs in the broader labor market, that may
have been better matches. Living in an enclave may also lower the speed with which new immi-
grants learn host country skills, e.g. language, which may reduce their chances of moving to better
jobs ((Lazear 1999)). Whether new immigrants bene￿t from such segregation may depend on the
quality of the enclave, (e.g. the stock of human capital) ((Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund 2003);
(Borjas 1992); (Borjas 1995)).
The causal effect of enclaves or networks, more generally, is dif￿cult to determine because
of the likelihood of omitted variables bias. Unmeasured factors may make immigrants from a
particular country more suitable for certain jobs that are concentrated in particular areas. There
may be location speci￿c factors that result in good labor market outcomes. For example, new
immigrants to areas where existing immigrants have a low unemployment rate may also have a low
unemployment rate, not because the existing immigrants are better able to help the new arrivals, but
because labor market conditions are generally favorable there. Moreover, there may be important
unmeasured differences between individuals who choose to locate near other members of their
ethnic group and those who do not.
Some papers address omitted variables bias by using instrumental variable techniques. Munshi
(2003) studies Mexican migrants in the United States. He proxies the individual’s network by the
proportion of the sampled individuals from his community who are located in the U.S. in that year.
To avoid endogeneity problems, he uses lagged rainfall in the origin-community as an instrument
for the size of network at the destination. He ￿nds that the same individual is more likely to be
employed and to hold a higher paying non-agricultural job when his network is exogenously larger.
Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003) study the effects of ethnic enclaves on earnings using data
2from an immigrant policy initiative in Sweden, when government authorities distributed refugee
immigrants across locales based on the availability of housing. They argue that this provides a
natural experiment which allows them to estimate the causal effect of living in enclaves. They
instrument current location attributes with attributes of the initial assigned location and ￿nd that
enclaves improve labor market outcomes for less skilled immigrants. Although these papers are
well-executed, they examine quite atypical immigrants, Mexican immigrants to the United States
and refugees in Sweden, and their ￿ndings may not extend to other immigrants.
Although it is not the principal focus of our paper, we also examine network size, measured by
the share of the local area population from the immigrant’s country of birth. We adopt a difference
in differences approach to estimate the network effect. This approach addresses some of the bias
arisingfromunobservablegroup/locationcharacteristics, butmaystillsufferfrombiasarisingfrom
unobservables that vary across both group and location or from individual-speci￿c unobservables.
We undertake this exercise primarily because it permits comparison of our results with the existing
literature. We ￿nd that a larger network is associated with a higher probability of ￿nding a job and
also a higher probability of ￿nding the ￿rst job using the social network, but the magnitudes of the
effects are small. We ￿nd no evidence of a positive effect of network size on wages in ￿rst jobs.
In section 2 we develop the theoretical model of networks and derive its implications. Section
3 describes the empirical framework. In section 4 we provide a brief description of the data. The
main empirical results are presented in section 5. Section 6 presents the structural models, while
section 7 concludes.
2 THEORETICAL MODEL
The model draws heavily on Montgomery (1992). The result regarding the expected wage condi-
tional on job-￿nding method can be found there in general form by translating variables appropri-
ately.
Consider a recent immigrant looking for jobs. He faces two sources of job offers, the network
source, and the formal/non-network source. Suppose that with probability pn he receives an offer
through the network, and with probability pf he receives a job offer through the formal source.
Also assume that he can receive at most one offer from each source. In each case, the wage offer is
drawn from a common distribution function F(w). Thus, we assume that the distribution of wage
offers is independent of the source (relaxed later), and immigrants are homogenous.
There is a single time period. The immigrant worker accepts an offer if he receives at least
one offer greater than his reservation wage. If he receives two offers, he chooses the higher offer,
3provided that it is higher than his reservation wage. For the moment, there is no loss in generality
in treating wage offers below the reservation wage as non-offers, and de￿ning F(w) over the range
of wages greater than the reservation wage, and pn and pf as the probabilities of receiving an offer
greater than this cutoff.
2.1 Network Strength
With probability (1￿pn)￿(1￿pf), the worker receives no offers, with probability (1￿pn)￿pf,
he receives only a formal offer, with probability pn ￿ (1 ￿ pf), he receives only a network offer,
and with probability pn ￿ pf, he receives both types of offers.
The expected wage conditional on receiving at least one job offer is
E(w) =
(pf + pn ￿ 2pfpn)E(wjN = 1) + pfpnE(wjN = 2)
(pf + pn ￿ pfpn)
(1)
where N is the number of job offers received. It is straightforward to show that E(w) is increasing
in pn (and pf), provided the wage offer distribution is nondegenerate.
What about wages conditional on the method through which the job was found? The expected
wage conditional on accepting a job through the network is,
E(wjn) = (1 ￿ pf)E(wjN = 1) + pfE(wjN = 2) (2)
which is independent of pn:
The expected wage conditional on accepting a job through the formal source is,
E(wjf) = (1 ￿ pn)E(wjN = 1) + pnE(wjN = 2) (3)
which is increasing in pn.
It follows immediately that the gap between the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job
through the network and the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the formal mech-
anism is decreasing in network strength, as de￿ned by pn.
Finally, consider the level of the difference in earnings conditional on job ￿nding method:
E(wjn) ￿ E(wjf) = (pf ￿ pn)(E(wjN = 2) ￿ E(wjN = 1)): (4)
The sign of this difference depends on the relative probability of ￿nding a job through the formal
4method and the network. If the network is less likely to produce a job than the formal source
(pn < pf), then workers who ￿nd jobs through networks will have higher wages, on average, than
those who ￿nd them through formal methods. Note that, if the network is more likely to produce
a job than the formal source, then those ￿nding jobs through networks will have lower wages than
do those ￿nding them through formal methods. This is the key insight in Montgomery (1992).
The intuition for this counterintuitive result is straightforward. Consider an extreme example.
Supposethenetworkalmostnevergeneratesajoboffer(pn iscloseto0)whileformalsearchalmost
always yields an offer (pf is close to 1). In this scenario, almost all recent immigrants receive an
offer from the formal source while very few receive an offer from the network. Therefore, those
who accepted network jobs almost de￿nitely chose between two offers, while those who accepted
formal jobs, almost all chose the one offer they had. Therefore, those in network jobs have higher
wages compared to those in formal jobs, even though the network is weaker than the formal source.
The result on the sign of the difference in earnings conditional on job ￿nding method is sensi-
tive to the assumption that the distribution of wages is the same for the two job sources. When the
network distribution stochastically dominates, or is a mean preserving spread of the formal distri-
bution, it is more likely that expected wage conditional on ￿nding the job through the network is
higher than expected wage conditional on ￿nding the job through the formal source irrespective of
the relation between pn and pf:2
2.2 Differing Wage Distributions
Let the distribution of wages received through the network conditional on receiving an offer be
Fn(w), and similarly, the distribution of the formal wages conditional on receiving an offer be
Ff(w).
The expected wage conditional on receiving a job offer is,
E(w) =
pf(1 ￿ pn)E(wf) + pn(1 ￿ pf)E(wn) + pfpnE(wjN = 2)
(pf + pn ￿ pfpn)
: (5)
As before, improvements in the strength of either the formal or network domains will raise ex-
pected wages.
2However, in a slightly different context, Montgomery (1992) provides examples to show that even when both
sources are equally strong and the network distribution stochastically dominates or is a mean preserving spread of
the formal distribution, expected wage conditional on network job could be lower than expected wage conditional
on formal job. Thus, the sign of the difference in expected wage conditional on job ￿nding method can go in either
direction when the network and formal distributions are different.
5The expected wage conditional on accepting a job through a network is,
E(wjn) =
(1 ￿ pf)E(wn) + pfE(wnjwn > wf)P(wn > wf)
1 ￿ pf + pfP(wn > wf)
(6)
which, as in the simpler model, is independent of pn.
The expected wage conditional on accepting a job through formal means is,
E(wjf) =
(1 ￿ pn)E(wf) + pnE(wfjwf > wn)P(wf > wn)
1 ￿ pn + pnP(wf > wn)
(7)
which, as before, is increasing in pn. Therefore, the gap between the expected wage conditional
on ￿nding a job through the network and the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through
formal mechanisms, is decreasing in network strength, as de￿ned by pn.
2.3 Effects at Percentiles of Observed Wage Distribution
It is important to note that while economists often focus on differences in means, our argument
applies equally to percentiles of the observed wage distributions.
The cdf of the observed network wage distribution is independent of pn because conditional
on receiving a network offer, the probability that the offer will be better than the formal offer is
independent of the probability of a network offer.
In contrast, as described in the following theorem, the cdf of the observed formal sector wage
distribution Ff(wjf) is decreasing in pn:
Theorem 1 Let Ff(w) be continuous on [a;b] with Ff(a) = 0 and Ff(b) = 1: Then
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The theorem establishes that the percentile associated with any wage, except the highest and
the lowest, in the observed formal sector wage distribution (wage conditional on formal sector em-
ployment) is reduced when the probability of a network offer increases. The intuition is straight-
forward. Any network offer beats a formal offer if it is greater than the formal offer and has no
effect on the acceptance of formal offers above it. Most network offers will beat a very low formal
offer but will not beat a very high formal offer. On average, therefore a network offer reduces the
probability that the worker accepts a low formal offer by more than it reduces the probability that
the workers accepts a high formal offer. The distribution of accepted offers shifts to the right. From
this intuition, it should be clear that the effect on the percentiles does not depend on the continuity
of Fn although the math will be slightly messier if the distribution has mass points.
Since the percentile of the conditional distribution associated with each wage goes down, the
wage associated with each percentile goes up. Moreover, since the observed formal sector wage
distribution is independent of the probability of receiving a formal offer, it is an immediate corol-
lary that the difference between any percentile (except the very highest and very lowest) of the
observed formal sector wage distribution and the same percentile of the observed network wage
7distribution will increase when the probability of a network wage offer increases.
The effect of network strength on the difference in the observed network and formal wages at
each percentile suggests a potentially more powerful test of the model. Since there is no effect
at the highest and lowest percentiles, there must be some percentile at which the effect is larger
than the mean effect, and this difference might be suf￿cient to outweigh the reduced ef￿ciency of
estimating a percentile rather than the mean.
We anticipate that the effect of network strength on the formal/network wage differential will
be largest somewhere below the median. We offer two arguments for this intuition.
First, suppose that the (log) formal wage offer distribution is N(0;1). And assume that the net-
work sector distribution is degenerate at some value, say 0; for concreteness. If the network is very
weak so that the probability of a network offer is close to 0; then the observed wage distribution in
the formal sector is very close to the formal offer distribution, and its 2.5 percentile is very close
to -1.96, its median to 0, its 97.5 percentile to 1.96. Now assume that when the network is strong,
the probability of a network offer is close to 1. Then the observed formal distribution is very close
to a truncated standard normal, and its 2.5 percentile is very close to .031, its median to .67 and
its 97.5 percentile to 2.24. It will be apparent that the effect on the observed formal sector wage
distribution will generally be larger at lower centiles (although the effect goes to zero as the centile
being considered goes to zero).3 This need not hold for all distributions, but it will frequently be
true, so that we expect larger effects at lower centiles.
Second, numerical simulations show that if fn and ff have the same normal distribution and
if the probability of a network offer is .25 when the network is weak and .5 when the network is
strong, values roughly consistent with our data, then the biggest wage change occurs at roughly
the 25th percentile.
2.4 Summary of Predictions
In sum, in the simple case of one offer from each source, the model has the following predictions
regarding network strength, (the probability of ￿nding the job through the network):
1. The expected wage is increasing in network strength.
2. If the distribution of wage offers in the formal and network sectors are identical, the expected
wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the network is higher than the expected wage
conditional on ￿nding a job through formal methods if and only if pn < pf.
3The effect at the 2.5, 50 and 97.5 percentiles is 1.991, 0.67 and 0.28 respectively.
83. The difference between the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the network
and the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through formal methods, is decreasing in
network strength.
4. At any given centile, the difference between the wage conditional on ￿nding a job through
the network and the corresponding centile of the wage distribution conditional on ￿nding a
job through formal methods is decreasing in network strength. The magnitude of this effect
varies across centiles.
In this simple case, implications (1), (3) and (4) hold even when the network distribution is not
the same as the distribution of formal job offers.4
3 Empirical Framework
Our empirical strategy begins by verifying that the proposed measures of network strength and
network size do predict network use. Having validated these measures in this way, we then ask
whether or not these measures predict wages. Finally, we examine whether network strength inter-
acts with network use as predicted by the theoretical model.
We propose that network size be measured by the log of the share of working age population
in the locality who are from the new immigrant’s country of birth. Network strength be proxied
by, whether or not the new immigrant had at least one close friend or relative in the locality when
he ￿rst arrived. Since we will focus on labor market outcomes six months after arrival, this is a
plausible proxy.
Validating the Network Measures: To validate these proxies, we use multinomial logit to ex-
amine how they are related to the individual’s employment outcome (unemployed, in job found
















4Montgomery derives implication (2) above for the case where a worker has M formal contacts each with prob-
ability pf of producing an offer and N network contacts each with probability pn of producing an offer, and each
offer is drawn from the same wage distribution. Unfortunately, we cannot prove implications (3) and (4) for the case
of multiple contacts. The problem is that with multiple contacts, an increase in the probability of getting an offer
through each member of the network not only increases the overall probability of getting an offer, but also changes
the distribution of the highest wage offer received through the network. Therefore, the proofs in subsections 2.2 and
2.3 above do not apply. However, the fact that when networks are stronger than formal sources, conditional wages
are higher for formal jobs than network jobs, and that, when networks are weaker than formal sources, the opposite is
true, suggests that predictions (3) and (4) will apply generally, albeit not universally.
9for l = NJ;FJ i.e. network job and formal job respectively; U stands for unemployment, F is a
dummy variable for having at least one friend/relative in the locality upon arrival, S is the network
size variable, X is a set of additional controls that are likely to in￿uence use of social networks in
￿nding a job, and ! and ￿ are country of birth dummies and locality dummies. The subscripts i;j
and k; refer to individual i, country of birth j, and locality k.
We view the multinomial logit as a simple way to assess the relation between our network
measures andjob ￿nding.5 Better networksshould increase theprobability of networkemployment
relative to formal employment (￿
NJ > ￿
FJ) and they should increase the probability of network
employment relative to unemployment (￿
NJ > 0): In a purely ad hoc sense, it is not obvious
whether a better network should have a larger or smaller proportional effect on unemployment than
on formal sector employment. Therefore, when validating our measures, we make no prediction
about the sign of ￿
FJ: However, it is straightforward to show that in the context of our model,
network strength should have a larger effect on unemployment than on formal sector employment





Network Structure: Once the network measures are validated, we regress various wage mea-
sures on the validated network measures, country of birth dummies, locality dummies, and other
controls that are likely to affect labor market outcomes. This approach is given by,




k + ￿ijk: (10)
where the variables are de￿ned as in equation (9) above. The model predicts that workers with
better networks will have higher wages.
In part, we carry out this estimation to permit comparison of results with the existing literature.
The evidence on the effects of ethnic enclaves is mixed.7 As discussed in the introduction, enclaves
5In principle, we could derive the multinomial logit speci￿cation as given by (9) by specifying the value of a job
outcome . If we normalize the value of unemployment to be zero, assume that the unobservable is extreme value and
that draws from the network and formal sectors are independent, this speci￿cation justi￿es the use of multinomial
logit. However, this justi￿cation implies that network strength shifts the distribution of network (and possibly formal)
offers. In contrast, our theory assumes that network strength only increases the arrival rate of network offers.
6The probability of unemployment is (1￿pn)(1￿pf) while the probability of formal employment is pf(1￿￿pn)
where ￿ is the probability that the the worker chooses the network job if he has both network and formal offers. So
the log ratio of formal employment to unemployment is log(pf) ￿ log(1 ￿ pf) + log(1 ￿ ￿pn) ￿ log(1 ￿ pn) and its
derivative with respect to pn is (1 ￿ ￿)=[(1￿pn)(1￿￿pn) > 0: Therefore our model implies that ￿
FJ
1 > 0: However,
in a more general model, network strength might also increase ￿; in which case the derivative would be unsigned.
7Munshi (2003) and Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund (2003) ￿nd that networks improve the labor market outcomes
of Mexican immigrants to the United States and of refugees in Sweden. For three major cities in Canada, Hou and
Picot (2003) ￿nd only a weak effect of exposure to own-group neighbours on immigrants’ employment probability
and annual earnings. In contrast, Lazear (1999) argues that immigrant enclaves reduce the rate at which immigrants
10may bene￿t or hurt immigrants. Also, many studies have not fully addressed the omitted variables
bias issues that typically plague the estimation of network effects. Since we control for both
location and country of birth, our network measures are unlikely to be correlated with location
characteristics or group characteristics. Thus, ￿2 is a difference in differences estimator. It is
identi￿ed through variations in network size between, for example, Indians in Toronto and Indians
in Ottawa, and comparing this difference with variations in network size between the Chinese
acrossthesametwocities. BiasofthisformwouldariseonlyifIndianimmigrantsweremorelikely
than Chinese immigrants to locate in Toronto, because the industrial structure of the city bene￿ts
Indians more than it does the Chinese immigrants. This cannot be ruled out completely, but our
greater concern is that where the immigrant locates may tell us something about the immigrant:
a Russian immigrant who locates where there are few established Russian immigrants, may be
quite different from one who seeks out a Russian immigrant enclave. Nevertheless, this approach
is useful because it is straightforward and addresses directly the effect of network structure on
immigrant labor market outcomes.
Testing the Role of Networks: Our primary focus is to test whether the wage difference between
those who found their jobs using networks and those who found them using formal mechanisms
is related to the validated measure of network strength. The equation above is augmented with
an interaction between whether the individual found his ￿rst job through the social network, and
whether he had at least one friend or relative in the locality when he ￿rst arrived.




k + ￿ijk (11)
where NJ is a dummy for whether the individual found his ￿rst job through the social network.
As explained in the theory section, when the immigrants’ networks are stronger than formal
channels (more likely to happen when they have a friend/relative close by), the effect of ￿nding
a job through the network should be negative, while when they are weaker, it should be positive.
However, this result could also re￿ect other factors, such as differences between the wage dis-
tributions in the two sectors. The testable implication of the model is that ￿4 is negative, that is
the difference between the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the network and
the expected wage conditional on ￿nding a job through the formal mechanism (in other words the
network premium), is decreasing in network strength.
An important advantage of this approach over the standard method of regressing labor market
learn the host-country language, while there is a large literature indicating that knowledge of host-country language
raises wages (see Berman, Lang, and Siniver, 2003, and the references therein).
11outcomes on measures of network structure, is that it mitigates problems associated with omitted
variables. New immigrants are likely to share the unmeasured characteristics of established immi-
grants. Thus, the outcomes of new and established immigrants are likely to be positively correlated
even if there is no causal relation. If a locality is especially conducive to good labor market out-
comes for a particular immigrant group, this is likely to generate a positive correlation between
the outcomes of new and established immigrants. In contrast, there is little reason to expect that,
in areas where an immigrant group has a particular advantage, or where the group is particularly
favorably selected, the bias will depend on the method through which the new immigrant ￿nds a
job. What about the interaction term? One would have to think of an unobservable that would
affect the network-formal wage differential differently for those with and without strong social
ties. We do not see an obvious reason to expect such a relation. The most plausible case might be
that we expect immigrants to be more likely to move to a locality where they have a strong tie if
the network is particularly valuable in that area. If so, the coef￿cient on the interaction term will
be biased in a positive direction, and we will be less likely to observe the negative coef￿cient our
theoretical model predicts. The main motivation for including the interaction term comes from our
theoretical model and the prediction that it have a signi￿cant negative sign in equilibrium. Thus,
our main focus is to test the sign on ￿4.
As discussed in the theory section, the prediction that ￿4 is negative applies not only to the con-
ditional mean (OLS estimation) but also to all conditional quantiles except the highest and lowest.
However, we would expect ￿4 to be most negative at quantiles below the median. We therefore also
use quantile regression to estimate equation (11) at the 25th, 50th and 75th percentiles.
4 Data and Descriptive Analysis
4.1 Data
We use a 20% 2001 Census of Canada sample to calculate characteristics of immigrant popula-
tions by country of origin and location within Canada. The sample is restricted to the working
age population (those between 24 and 64 years old). According to the 2001 Census, immigrants
constitute 18 percent of the Canadian population, and 21 percent of the labor force. They come
from more than 200 source countries. In order to ensure that there are suf￿cient observations in
each cell to calculate network measures with reasonable precision, source countries with fewer
than 500 immigrants in the census sample are dropped. The geographic unit used to characterize
12local networks is the Census Metropolitan Area, CMA, or the Census Agglomeration, CA.8 Using
the 2001 Census, we calculate the share of working age population in each CMA/CA from each
source country, which is our measure of network size. Measures of the wage distribution of the
employed immigrant population from a particular country, residing in a particular CMA/CA, are
also obtained from the Census.
Our remaining data come from the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada (LSIC), col-
lected by Statistics Canada, and Citizenship and Immigration Canada. The LSIC sample consists
of immigrants who arrived in Canada between October 1, 2000 and September 30, 2001 and were
15 years or older. We refer to this population as recent immigrants. The LSIC is a longitudinal sur-
vey with three waves: six months, two years and four years after arrival in Canada. It provides data
on the recent immigrant’s characteristics, such as, sex, age, education, languages spoken, country
of birth and geographic location in Canada, and also his job history, which includes labor force
status, weekly wage if employed, etc. We restrict the sample to those respondents between 24 and
64 years old who are in the labor force. In the ￿rst wave, 74 percent of this age group were in
the labor force. We drop individuals whose ￿rst job was arranged before they migrated to Canada,
or who were either self employed, or in a family business,9 and those who change CMA/CA.10
We limit the analysis to observations from CMA/CAs and from source countries with at least ten
immigrants in the LSIC sample, and those from source countries retained in the census sample.11
The ￿nal wave one LSIC sample consists of 5103 recent immigrants, from 51 different source
countries and residing in 16 different CMA/CAs across Canada.12
8A census metropolitan area (CMA), or a census agglomeration (CA), is formed by one or more adjacent munici-
palities centered on a large urban area, known as the urban core. The census population count of the urban core is at
least 10,000 to form a census agglomeration, and at least 100,000 to form a census metropolitan area. To be included
in the CMA or CA, other adjacent municipalities must have a high degree of integration with the central urban area, as
measured by commuting ￿ows derived from census place of work data. In the 2001 Census, there are 27 CMAs and
113 CAs across Canada.
9In the ￿rst wave of the LSIC, 8.5 percent of the recent immigrants in the labor force are in pre-arranged jobs. 2.6
percent report being self-employed and 0.6 percent report being involved in a family business, when asked about their
￿rst jobs.
10A mover is dropped because it is not clear whether one should consider his network to be the relevant group in
the new location or in the old one. For example it could be the case that a person’s network in his previous location
helped him ￿nd a job in his current location. In this case, it would be incorrect to characterise the relevant group at
the current/interview location as his social network. In order to simplify matters and present clean results movers are
excluded from the sample. At the time of the ￿rst wave, 7.7 percent of recent immigrants in the labour force had
changed CMA/CA.
11We lose only 8% of the remaining LSIC sample due to these location and source country restrictions.
12Of the 16 CMA/CAs only one (Guelph) is a CA. Therefore, henceforth they will be referred to as CMAs.
134.2 Descriptive Analysis
Although we drop a large number of countries and localities, the largest sending countries and
the largest receiving localities account for the vast majority of immigrants. According to the 2001
Census, the top twenty source countries account for 68% of the working age immigrant population.
In recent years there has been a change in the composition of source countries, with an increase
in share of immigrants from Asia, and a decline in the share from Europe. According to the
LSIC, China followed by India are the top two source countries for recent immigrants, constituting
22 percent and 15 percent of the working age recent immigrant population. Recent immigrants
are settling in areas where there is an already large concentration of both native and immigrant
population. Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa, Calgary have 52 percent of Canada’s working-
age population, 75 percent of its working-age immigrants and 83 percent of its recent working-age
immigrants.
Table 1 shows the means for the variables in the ￿rst wave of the LSIC. By the time of the ￿rst
wave, 69 percent of the sample had held a ￿rst job. Of these 42 percent (29 percent of the entire
sample) reported that they found this job through a friend or relative, which we de￿ne as a network
job. The remainder used other methods, such as, contacting the employer directly, responding to
newspaper advertisements, employment agencies, the internet, referral from another employer or
a union. We refer to these as formal jobs.
We proxy network strength by a binary variable. It takes the value 1, if the individual reports
that he already had at least one relative or friend in the city where he resides, when he ￿rst arrived
in Canada. While 89 percent had at least one relative or friend in Canada on arrival, 82 percent had
one in the city where they reside. By this measure, most recent immigrants have strong networks.
We capture the size of the recent immigrant’s network by the natural logarithm of the share
of working age CMA population from his country of birth. Note that, since CMA dummies are
included, this is isomorphic to including the natural logarithm of the number of immigrants from
his country of birth. We cannot distinguish between the roles of absolute and relative size.
Two things must be noted at this point. First, ￿nding the ￿rst job through the social network
does not necessarily imply the presence of a relative or friend in the same city of residence on
arrival. Immigrants may have found their ￿rst job through a friend made after migrating to Canada,
a relative or friend elsewhere, or through a compatriot who is not a relative or close friend. Thus,
having a network job does not imply having a strong network. Second, to the extent that job search
is complex, the dichotomous measure of the ￿use of the social network￿ and the theoretical concept
it wishes to capture are not perfectly correlated. For example, if a friend tells me that there are job
openings where he works, and I apply and get a job there, do I report that I found the job through a
14friend, or that I applied directly to the employer? Thus, admittedly, the measure of use of network
(i.e. having a network job) is imperfect.
5 Results
5.1 Validating the Network Measures
Table 2 shows the relation between network size, network strength and various background char-
acteristics, on the one hand, and whether the recent immigrant found a network job or a formal
job or did not ￿nd a job. The table gives multinomial logit coef￿cients. Although the coef￿cients
are not derivatives, they are directly related to the probability of the employment outcome rela-
tive to unemployment. Finding the effect of a variable on network employment relative to formal
employment requires comparing the two coef￿cients.
The ￿rst two columns give the determinants of ￿rst job type after six months. Our key variable,
network strength is strongly related to the probability of getting a network offer within the ￿rst six
months. The derivative at the mean probabilities is about 11 percentage points.13
As noted earlier, for the network strength measure to be valid, its coef￿cient in the network job
equation should be greater than its coef￿cient in the formal job equation. This is con￿rmed. Our
model implies that the coef￿cient in the formal job equation should be positive. While positive
values lies within the con￿dence interval, the point estimates are negative.
Incontrast, thenetworksizemeasureincreasesthevalueofbothformalandnetworkoffers, and
the effect is statistically signi￿cant in both cases although the coef￿cient in the network equation
is noticeably larger. As a result a larger network is associated with a high probability of having a
network job but has little effect on the probability of having a formal job.
This pattern holds for ￿rst jobs reported within the ￿rst two and ￿rst four years. Network
strength continues to have a large positive effect on the value of a network job while having no
effect on the value of a formal job. The effect of network size on ￿rst jobs declines with time
in Canada. By the third wave of the LSIC the effect of network size is no longer statistically
signi￿cant at conventional levels although its magnitude has dropped only slightly.
It is not surprising that the results for ￿rst jobs are consistent across the three pairs of columns.
13For any individual, the derivative of the probability of network sector employment with respect to a variable x is
Pn (bnPu + (bn ￿ bf)Pf) where bi is the coef￿cient on the variable in the network/formal employment equations and
Pi is the probability of being in sector i. In the text we describe derivatives calculated at the mean probabilities.
15Most of the immigrants found a ￿rst job within six months. The fact that even among those who
have been in Canada for four years, networks are important for ￿nding a ￿rst job does not tell us
whether networks continue to be important once immigrants have established themselves in the
labor market. To address this question, we turn to Table 3 which provides estimates of the effects
of networks on current jobs.
At six months the results are similar to those obtained for ￿rst jobs, presumably because many
of the immigrants’ current jobs are also their ￿rst jobs. The magnitude and signi￿cance of both the
strength and size terms are similar to those in Table 2. Strong ties increase the value of network
jobs but not formal jobs while network size has positive effects on both, albeit a stronger effect on
network jobs than on formal jobs.
The results for the current job at the interview at the end of the second year after arrival in
Canada are similar except that the effect of network size on the formal sector loses signi￿cance
even though its magnitude is greater than in the estimates at six months.
In contrast the importance of whether the immigrant had a close friend or relative in the locality
on arrival seems to diminish by the time he or she has been in Canada for four years. We cannot
tell whether this is because the importance of network strength declines once an immigrant has
been in Canada for a few years or because the strength of networks on arrival is a poor proxy
for strength of network after four years. To check if smaller sample size is driving the results for
current/recent jobs at the four year interview, we carry out a robustness check by restricting the
sample at the earlier interviews (six months and two years) to only those present at the four year
interview (results not shown here). Network strength continues to predict ￿nding current/recent
jobs using networks at the six month and two year interviews, even when the sample is restricted
as stated. Thus, it seems that the measures of network structure used here diminish in importance
over time either because networks are less important or because the nature of networks changes
with time spent in the host country. Interestingly, in the second and third waves, the coef￿cient
on network strength in the formal job equation shifts to the positive value predicted by our model
although it remains statistically insigni￿cant at conventional levels.
We view the results in Tables 2 and 3 as strong con￿rmation of the validity of our network
strength measure.
These tables also reveal that, recent immigrants with a high school or lower level of education
are more likely to ￿nd their ￿rst jobs using networks, while those with a university degree are less
likely to use networks to do so (reference category being immigrants with a college certi￿cate).
This conforms to the notion that the low skilled workers use networks much more than high skilled
16workers do.14 Surprisingly the tables also show that university graduates are less likely to be
employed. This could be because of more competition among highly educated immigrants in the
labor market.15 Also, immigrants ￿uent in English are less likely to use networks in ￿nding their
￿rst jobs.
5.2 Network Structure and Wages
Table 4 presents estimates of the relation between network measures and wages on ￿rst jobs found
by the ￿rst interview. In addition to our other network measures, we control for the median wage
received by established network members. This captures possible differences in the types of jobs
available to the immigrant. It generally has the wrong sign and is never positive and statistically
signi￿cant.
The ￿rst column presents the results of an otherwise standard wage equation augmented with
the network measures. Since it controls for both CMA and for country of origin, it can be inter-
preted as a difference-in-differences estimator. It reveals a small negative and statistically insignif-
icant effect of network size on earnings. This is consistent with larger networks being associated
with a faster arrival rate of offers (given the effect on employment found in tables 2 and 3), but
with either little or no effect on the reservation wage, or increasing the arrival rate at the lower end
of the wage distribution.
The presence of at least one relative or friend in the locality on arrival (network strength) enters
with the right sign, and has a nontrivial point estimate (over 5 percent), but does not reach statistical
signi￿cance at conventional levels.
This ￿nding of an insigni￿cant effect of network size on earnings is consistent with previous
￿ndings for Canada. Hou and Picot (2003) examine the association between living in a visible
minorityenclaveandimmigrants’labormarketoutcomesinCanada’sthreelargestcities. Theyalso
￿nd little association between exposure to own-group neighbors and immigrants’ annual earnings.
Since controls for language are included here, these results are not directly comparable to Lazear
14Departure from this conventional notion is examined in Saxenian (1999). The paper examines the extent to which
the skilled Chinese and Indian immigrants are organizing ethnic networks in California’s Silicon Valley to support
the often risky process of starting new technology businesses. The author notes that Silicon Valley’s new immigrant
entrepreneurs are more highly skilled than their counterparts in traditional industries, but like those counterparts they
have created a rich fabric of professional and associational activities that facilitate immigrant job search, information
exchange, access to capital and managerial know-how and the creation of shared ethnic identities.
15As table 1 shows, 70 percent of recent immigrants in our sample hold a university degree. Thus, most Canadian
immigrants today are highly educated. They may be competing for jobs amongst themselves, especially as ￿nding
good job matches takes longer for highly skilled workers.
17(1999) in the United States, but they do not con￿rm an adverse effect of ethnic enclaves. As
discussed before, there are some endogeneity concerns that are not addressed by the approach in
table 4. Therefore, it is not clear whether these results differ from Edin, Fredriksson, and Aslund
(2003) because of differences in the nature of immigrants to Sweden and Canada, or because of
differences in approach.
The remaining columns present the results of quantile estimates. Because there is no sim-
ple cluster correction for quantile estimates, a clustered bootstrap method is used to calculate the
standard errors. This approach is problematic because, since clusters rather than observations are
resampled, the number of observations can vary across replications, and will typically be smaller
than the number in the actual sample. This should, therefore, produce upwards biased standard
errors for the coef￿cients of variables for which cluster has little or no explanatory power. There-
fore, the result of the cluster bootstrap is only reported for network size, since it is measured at the
level of the cluster, and ordinary standard errors are reported for the remaining variables which are
measured at the level of the individual.
Columns (2) - (4) present quantile regression results for wages, conditional on having a wage.
The results are similar to those obtained using OLS, although there is some evidence of an even
largereffectofnetworkstrengthoninitialwagesatthe25thpercentile, andthiseffectisstatistically
signi￿cant at 0.1 level. A strong network results in a 9.4 percent increase in wages in ￿rst jobs at
the 25th percentile of an individual’s accepted wage offer distribution.16 There is also evidence
of an effect on wages at the median and 75th percentile of the worker’s wage distribution. These
effectsaresimilarinmagnitude tothoseobtainedusingOLSalthoughonlytheeffect onthemedian
is statistically signi￿cant and then only at the .1 level.
Since networks affect the probability of being employed, looking only at the wages of the
employed could give a misleading picture of their effect. For example, if networks are particularly
effective in providing low-productivity workers with jobs, they might appear to lower wages even
if they raise the offer distribution for all workers. To address this concern, columns (5) and (6)
also include the unemployed immigrants (who are in the labor force) by assigning them very low
wages. It is not possible to estimate the model for the 25th percentile because a high proportion of
new immigrants are unemployed. There is continued weak evidence of a positive effect of network
strength on wages, in that the coef￿cients are numerically, but not statistically, signi￿cant. In table
5, we extend the analysis to include individuals who found their ￿rst job after six months up to four
16Because there are controls for education and other factors that affect wages, the quantile regression results need
to be interpreted carefully. The coef￿cient gives the effect of, for example, network strength on the 25th percentile
of an individual’s conditional acceptable wage offer distribution. This is quite different from saying the effect on the
individual at the 25th percentile of the unconditional wage offer distribution.
18years. The results are broadly similar. The effect of network strength is positive and statistically
signi￿cantatconventionallevelsforthe25thpercentileofwagesin￿rstjobs(conditionalonhaving
a job) obtained within two and within four years
5.3 Augmented Wage Model
As discussed above, the network structure approach is limited by the concern that individuals who
locate near friends or family, or in areas where there are an unusually large number of established
immigrants from their country of birth, differ in unmeasured ways from those who do not.17 There-
fore, we turn to testing the prediction of the theoretical model.
Table 6 shows the results for the wage equation augmented with method of ￿nding the ￿rst
job (whether or not it was found using the network) and the interaction between this variable and
network strength.18 It is easy to tell stories in which the use of a network is positively or negatively
correlated with unobserved worker characteristics, but less easy to explain why this correlation
should be noticeably different for those with and without strong networks. Therefore, our focus is
on the interaction term.
Panel A shows the results for ￿rst jobs found within six months of arrival. Column (1) shows
thatamongthosewhodidnothaveafriendorrelativenearbywhenthey￿rstarrivedattheirlocality
in Canada, ￿nding a job through a network is associated with a trivial and statistically insigni￿cant
0.2 percent lower wage. In contrast, among those with a friend or relative, the wage penalty
associated with ￿nding a job through a network is about 3.2 percentage points bigger although
again not statistically signi￿cant.
However, as discussed earlier the theory section predicts that the coef￿cient on the interaction
term will be negative at all quantiles, and there is strong reason to expect it to be more negative
when we examine lower quantiles. Therefore in columns (2)-(4) we present quantile regressions
for the 25th, 50th and 75th quantiles. As in earlier tables, only the standard error for network
size is adjusted for clustering. As we should anticipate column (2), pertaining to wages at the
25th percentile (of the conditional wage distribution), conforms closely with the predictions of the
17Endogeneity of locating close to a friend or relative conditional on having one, does not seem to be a serious
problem. Fully 92 percent of the recent immigrants who had at least one relative or friend in Canada chose to live
close to their ties. One cannot completely rule out the possibility that individuals who choose to move to Canada
without having a friend or relative present are different from other immigrants. However, we control for the presence
of a relative or friend in Canada but not in the same locality as the recent immigrant. Such immigrants do not differ
from those who do not have a tie in Canada.
18When interpreting the coef￿cients on network strength, network job and their interaction, it should be noted that
the omitted group is that of immigrants in formal jobs and without strong social ties.
19theoretical model. For wages at the 50th and 75th percentile, the interaction term is negative, as
predicted, but is small and statistically insigni￿cant.
Also at the 25th percentile, in the absence of strong networks (strong social ties), those ￿nd-
ing their ￿rst jobs through networks have weekly wages that are 17.2 percent higher than those
doing so using formal means. In other words, at the lower end of the wage distribution, among
recent immigrants who do not have a strong social tie in their locality upon arrival, those who
are in network jobs earn a wage that is 17.2 percent higher compared to those who obtained jobs
through formal channels. The model predicts this difference if networks are less likely to relay job
offers than are formal methods (more likely to happen in the absence of a relative or friend close
by). However, as mentioned earlier, this ￿nding is also consistent with other explanations such as
unobserved differences between network users and non-users, or differences between the network
and formal wage offer distributions. More importantly, as predicted by the model, the coef￿cient
on the interaction term is negative and statistically signi￿cant. For those who have a strong social
tie, those who are in network jobs earn a wage that in only 0.8 percent higher (17.2-16.4) compared
to those who obtained jobs through formal channels. In other words, for those who have at least
one relative or friend in their locality, the network premium (network-formal wage differential) is
16.4 percent lower (network premium for those with strong networks is 0.8 percent) compared to
the network premium for immigrants without strong networks (network premium for those without
strong networks is 17.2 percent). Therefore the network premium is decreasing in network strength
as predicted by the theoretical model.
In panels B and C of table 6, the estimates are replicated by adding in workers who found their
￿rst job after six months but within two and four years respectively. As seen here, the interaction
term continues to be negative and signi￿cant albeit only at the .1 level in panel C.19
6 Structural Model
The results in the previous section are broadly consistent with the formal theoretical model pre-
sented earlier. However, it is not clear that the magnitudes of the effects can be reconciled with
reasonable restrictions on the formal and network sector wage distributions. In this section, we
ask whether a model with a single network wage offer distribution and a single formal sector wage
offer distribution can ￿t the data.
19We also examined the network effect on wages by restricting the analysis to various sub-samples, according to
gender and education and to immigrants who belonged to countries where English was not the lingua franca. The
results were not demonstrably different and no interesting patterns across sub-groups were observed, possibly because
standard errors get too large when sub-samples are used.
206.1 The Model
We assume that the immigrant receives offers with probability
pf from the formal sector
pw from the network sector if his network is weak
ps from the network sector if his network is strong.
Let wf, and wn; where n 2 fw;sg; represent (log) wage offer from the formal sector, a weak





The imigrant receives zero, one or two offers. If he receives no offers, he is unemployed. If
he receives one offer, he accepts that offer and is employed at the offered wage. If he receives two
offers, he chooses the higher offer and is employed at that higher wage.
6.2 Estimation
The model has ￿ve free parameters: pf; pw; ps; ￿n; and ￿2
n: We choose these parameters to match
eight empirical parameters. The ￿rst four are employment probabilities: the probability of being
employed in the formal sector when the network is strong, the probability of being employed in
the formal sector when the network is weak, the probability of being employed in the network
sector when the network is strong and the probability of being employed in the network sector
when the network is weak. The next four are wage differentials between the network and formal
sectors depending on whether the network is strong or weak. In each case we match both the mean
differential and the 25th percentile differential.
The covariances among the empirical parameters are not derived easily. Therefore we treat
them as zero and minimize
L = ￿




where b m is the value of the moment implied by our model and m is the empirical estimate of the
moment and ￿2 is the variance of that empirical estimate.
216.3 Results
The parameter estimates suggest that the distribution of offers from the network and formal sectors
are not all that different. The estimated mean (￿n) of the log wage offer distribution in the network
sector is -0.034 Log wages are also somewhat less dispersed in the network sector. The estimated
standard deviation (￿n) is 0.88, compared with the 1.0 assumed for the formal sector. The result
is that we estimate that the average wage offer in the network sector is about 86% of the average
wage in the formal sector.
We also estimate that immigrants are somewhat more likely to receive an offer from the formal
sector (48.3%) than they are from the network sector when they have a strong network (44.1%),
but they are much less likely to receive a network offer when their network is weak (23.9%).
Are these estimates consistent with observed distribution of wages among the employed recent
immigrants to Canada? Table 7 shows the relation between key parameters estimated from the data
and those derived from the model. The ￿rst eight parameters are the ones we tried to match. We
can see that the model does a very good job of matching the distribution of employment, matching
them to two signi￿cant digits. It also does a reasonable job of matching the average wage gap
between the network and formal sectors, both when individuals have a weak network and when
they have a strong network. The simulated (predicted) wage gap between the formal sector and
a network job for an individual with a strong network is 5.2% compared with an actual value of
3.4%. The difference is about a half standard error. Similarly the model predicts that individuals
with a weak network will earn 3.4% more if employed in a network job than in a formal job. The
data reveal a gap of -0.2%, a difference equal to about three-quarters of the standard error on the
estimate from the data.
The really large gap in the data occurs for individuals with a weak network who nevertheless
end up in a network job. In this case, from the data we estimate a 17.2% wage gap while the
model predicts a 12.1% gap, again a difference of about three-quarters of the standard error on
the estimate from the data. The difference between the predicted (1.7%) and actual (0.7%) gaps
when the network is strong is smaller. The value of our objective function at convergence is 2.18.
Since this objective function does not take account of the covariances among the moments we are
attempting to match, it does not provide a formal test of the model. It does, however, summarize
the result that we are able to match the empirical results quite closely. We are less interested in
a formal test of the model. Since it is quite implausible that both the network and formal sector
wage distributions are normally distributed and that the wage distributions in the network sector
are identical regardless of network strength, any failure to reject the model would merely reveal
the lack of power of the test. The objective of the structural model is to show that the magnitudes
22we observe, particularly at different quantiles of the wage distribution are very broadly consistent
with this model.
For this reason the last four rows of Table 7 show the wage gaps at the median and 75th per-
centiles, empirical values that we did not try to match directly. The results show that we match the
wage gaps between network and formal jobs quite accurately when the network is weak. The pre-
dicted median gap is 3.7% compared with an actual gap of 2.3%; the corresponding ￿gures at the
75th percentile are -5.0% and -3.1%. We also examine the difference between the network/formal
gap between immigrants with strong and weak networks. At the median the predicted difference
is -9.5% compared with an actual difference of -2.8%. This discrepancy is large but well within
the con￿dence interval for the empirical estimate. At the 75th percentile, the predicted and actual
differences are -7.7% and -2.6%. Although also large, this discrepancy is less than one standard
error.
In sum, a model in which the main effect of a stronger network is to increase the rate at which
offers arrive from the network rather than to draw on a different wage distribution is broadly con-
sistent with the data.
7 Summary and Conclusions
We developed a theoretical model of the importance of networks for recent immigrants seeking
jobs and derived the equilibrium results for immigrants with strong and weak networks. The model
shows that among immigrants with networks that are stronger than formal channels, those who are
innetworkjobshavelowerwagesthanthoseinformaljobs. Italsopredictsthatthenetwork-formal
wage differential is decreasing in network strength and that this effect should be most pronounced
at lower quantiles. We tested these implications on a nationally representative sample of recent
immigrants into Canada. The empirical strategy to carry out comparative statics, augments the
difference in differences framework with an interaction term between network strength and ￿nding
a networkjob, and focuseson the coef￿cientof this interactionterm. This strategyhas an important
advantage over the standard method of regressing labor market outcomes on measures of network
in￿uence, in that it mitigates problems associated with omitted variables. The model’s prediction
is not rejected in any of the speci￿cations, and is strongly supported for wages at the lower end of
an individual’s acceptable wage distribution. This suggests that the presence of at least one strong
social tie in the recent immigrant’s immediate neighborhood upon his arrival increases the number
of offers he receives from the network.
To test whether the magnitudes observed in the data were consistent with the theory, we es-
23timated a simple structural model in which network and formal offers are drawn from two log-
normal distributions. The model was able to produce parameters well within the con￿dence in-
tervals of the empirical estimates. This suggests that a model in which the primary role of strong
social ties is to increase the arrival rate of offers from the network distribution is consistent with the
data. Our results also suggest that the offer distributions in the formal and network sectors differ
only modestly so that Montgomery’s (1992) model can be applied.
It is often argued that immigrants tend to cluster together because the presence of established
immigrants facilitates assimilation of new arrivals, both in the labor market and in the social en-
vironment of the host country. We ￿nd that social networks help in the economic assimilation of
recent immigrants. Our ￿ndings suggest that immigrants with strong social ties in their localities
enjoy a faster arrival rate of jobs. We do not address other issues related to immigrant dispersion,
including the longer term labor market effects of immigrant enclaves.
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26Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Dependent Variables
Network Job 0.29 0.45 5103
Have a Job 0.69 0.46 5103
Weekly Wage 405 267.3 3390
Key Explanatory Variables
Strong Network 0.82 0.38 5103
Network Size (not in logs) 0.022 0.018 5103
Additional Explanatory Variables
Relative/Friend in Canada 0.89 0.31 5103
Female 0.41 0.49 5103
Age 35.5 8.1 5103
Married 0.83 0.37 5103
Number of children 0.94 0.94 5103
Speaks English Well 0.64 0.64 5103
Speaks French Well 0.12 0.12 5103
Lived in Canada Before 0.05 0.23 5103
Sponsored by Family Member 0.23 0.42 5103
Principal Applicant 0.72 0.45 5103
Economic Visa 0.77 5055
Family Visa 0.20 5055
Refugee Visa 0.03 5055
High School or Less 0.14 5075
Some University (no degree) 0.15 5075







Student/New Worker/None 0.42 5058
27Table 2: Network In￿uence on Finding First Job by Time of Survey
First Wave (6 months) Second Wave (2 years) Third Wave (4 years)
Formal Network Formal Network Formal Network
Network Size 0.180** 0.320*** 0.198** 0.313*** 0.147 0.246**
[0.074] [0.090] [0.079] [0.095] [0.090] [0.101]
Network Strength -0.073 0.473** -0.019 0.512*** -0.000 0.442***
[0.107] [0.187] [0.125] [0.182] [0.119] [0.170]
Relative/Friend not close by -0.069 -0.060 -0.043 0.022 -0.082 -0.071
[0.168] [0.270] [0.211] [0.272] [0.192] [0.228]
Female -0.247** -0.497*** -0.120 -0.321** -0.070 -0.279*
[0.107] [0.122] [0.115] [0.156] [0.124] [0.151]
Age -0.039*** -0.029*** -0.040*** -0.035*** -0.043*** -0.038***
[0.005] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.007]
Married 0.028 -0.165 0.053 -0.124 0.175 -0.006
[0.115] [0.128] [0.127] [0.147] [0.153] [0.163]
Kids -0.063 0.064 -0.036 0.073 -0.025 0.081
[0.044] [0.039] [0.059] [0.056] [0.066] [0.060]
High school or less1 0.073 0.463*** -0.106 0.422** -0.136 0.393*
[0.184] [0.160] [0.235] [0.214] [0.238] [0.233]
University degree1 -0.122 -0.281*** -0.297** -0.454*** -0.159 -0.316**
[0.089] [0.095] [0.138] [0.142] [0.156] [0.153]
Speak English well 0.077 -0.299*** 0.144 -0.242** 0.042 -0.350***
[0.095] [0.107] [0.127] [0.122] [0.105] [0.108]
Speak French well 0.298 -0.169 0.284 -0.012 0.110 0.003
[0.209] [0.244] [0.215] [0.257] [0.231] [0.241]
Lived in Canada Before 0.298 0.068 0.255 0.035 0.166 0.042
[0.187] [0.233] [0.235] [0.270] [0.219] [0.252]
Principal Applicant 0.225 0.022 0.124 -0.034 -0.000 -0.171
[0.158] [0.151] [0.193] [0.205] [0.196] [0.204]
Sponsored by family -0.110 0.043 0.231 0.466* 0.365 0.576*
[0.192] [0.233] [0.238] [0.277] [0.301] [0.329]
Family Visa2 -0.563** -0.021 -0.831*** -0.514 -0.966*** -0.634
[0.275] [0.322] [0.307] [0.344] [0.363] [0.401]
Refugee Visa2 -1.007** -0.130 -0.908** -0.076 -0.903** -0.066
[0.392] [0.325] [0.434] [0.387] [0.435] [0.397]
Observations 4982 4982 4982
Log Pseudolikelihood3 -4845.83 -4533.34 -4452.69
Clusters 383.00 383.00 383.00
Robust standard errors corrected for group effects within CMA/CA-country cells in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%;
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
3 "Pseudolikelihood" because with clustered data we do not have independent observations
Also controls for occupation before coming to Canada, country of birth and CMA.
28Table 3: Network In￿uence in Finding Current/Most Recent Job
First Wave (6 months) Second Wave (2 years) Third Wave (4 years)
Formal Network Formal Network Formal Network
Network Size 0.196*** 0.297*** 0.244 0.315* 0.309 0.392
[0.074] [0.090] [0.153] [0.173] [0.305] [0.320]
Network Strength -0.072 0.468** 0.006 0.574** 0.046 0.208
[0.101] [0.192] [0.246] [0.253] [0.312] [0.286]
Relative/Friend not close by -0.086 -0.044 -0.046 0.225 0.243 0.157
[0.166] [0.265] [0.380] [0.403] [0.558] [0.555]
Female -0.282** -0.439*** -0.373** -0.476*** -0.773** -0.961***
[0.110] [0.110] [0.169] [0.172] [0.321] [0.356]
Age -0.039*** -0.027*** -0.031** -0.031** -0.036* -0.040**
[0.005] [0.009] [0.013] [0.014] [0.020] [0.020]
Married 0.027 -0.11 0.010 -0.101 0.713* 0.520
[0.119] [0.111] [0.220] [0.246] [0.398] [0.436]
Kids -0.056 0.052 -0.144 0.002 -0.263 -0.070
[0.044] [0.039] [0.097] [0.089] [0.163] [0.147]
High school or less1 0.104 0.445*** 0.056 0.337 -0.274 0.150
[0.183] [0.159] [0.358] [0.373] [0.481] [0.568]
University degree1 -0.126 -0.284*** -0.366* -0.772*** -0.249 -0.511
[0.089] [0.092] [0.194] [0.193] [0.365] [0.392]
Speak English well 0.097 -0.312*** 0.516*** -0.115 0.252 -0.266
[0.097] [0.109] [0.166] [0.171] [0.281] [0.263]
Speak French well 0.274 -0.145 0.223 0.011 -0.249 -0.331
[0.216] [0.243] [0.295] [0.295] [0.444] [0.473]
Lived in Canada Before 0.300* 0.204 0.190 0.237 0.002 0.320
[0.182] [0.229] [0.393] [0.407] [0.612] [0.666]
Principal Applicant 0.2 0.104 0.309 0.217 -0.194 -0.516
[0.166] [0.148] [0.241] [0.258] [0.312] [0.333]
Sponsored by family -0.127 0.076 -0.340 -0.004 -0.322 0.389
[0.185] [0.237] [0.253] [0.261] [0.772] [0.716]
Family Visa2 -0.548* -0.122 -0.564 -0.416 -0.346 -0.498
[0.288] [0.323] [0.354] [0.390] [0.945] [0.881]
Refugee Visa2 -0.999** -0.213 -1.010* -0.076 0.632 1.015
[0.397] [0.318] [0.544] [0.533] [0.809] [0.748]
Observations 5003 3524 2585
Log Pseudolikelihood3 -4881.94 -2845.99 -1850.08
Clusters 385 312.00 246.00
Robust standard errors corrected for group effects within CMA/CA-country cells in brackets;
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%;
1 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
2 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
3 "Pseudolikelihood" because with clustered data we do not have independent observations
Also controls for occupation before coming to Canada, country of birth and CMA.
29Table 4: (Log) Wages for First Jobs within Six Months: Difference in Differences
OLS Quantile regressions
Without Unemployed With Unemployed
0.25 0.5 0.75 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Network Size -0.036 -0.044 -0.020 -0.059 0.181 -0.046
[0.029] [0.058] [0.038] [0.041] [0.205] [0.050]
Network Strength 0.056 0.094* 0.047* 0.044 0.070 0.063
[0.038] [0.048] [0.024] [0.038] [0.049] [0.039]
Median wage in network 0.003 -0.009 -0.007* -0.009 -0.004 -0.008
(000s per annum) [0.007] [0.007] [0.004] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006]
Relative/Friend not close by 0.075 0.024 0.028 0.114** 0.028 0.055
[0.063] [0.073] [0.035] [0.054] [0.071] [0.056]
Female -0.214*** -0.246*** -0.117*** -0.164*** -0.231*** -0.182***
[0.030] [0.034] [0.036] [0.027] [0.036] [0.029]
Age -0.003 -0.002 -0.002** -0.004** -0.010*** -0.007***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Married -0.017 -0.008 -0.028 -0.036 -0.020 -0.040
[0.045] [0.045] [0.027] [0.035] [0.047] [0.037]
Kids -0.026** -0.016 -0.001 -0.014 -0.008 -0.012
[0.013] [0.018] [0.010] [0.014] [0.019] [0.015]
High school or less2 0.143*** 0.072 0.049* 0.080* 0.185*** 0.100**
[0.034] [0.054] [0.027] [0.041] [0.058] [0.045]
University degree2 0.029 -0.014 -0.005 -0.007 0.009 -0.033
[0.035] [0.043] [0.021] [0.033] [0.044] [0.035]
Speak English well 0.068** -0.035 0.040** 0.083*** -0.034 0.070**
[0.034] [0.037] [0.018] [0.028] [0.037] [0.029]
Speak French well -0.162 -0.044 -0.179*** -0.106 0.010 -0.152**
[0.098] [0.090] [0.046] [0.070] [0.090] [0.070]
Lived in Canada Before 0.085 0.039 0.053 0.144** 0.096 0.131**
[0.081] [0.072] [0.037] [0.059] [0.074] [0.061]
Principal Applicant 0.055 0.060 -0.001 -0.025 0.131** 0.007
[0.049] [0.058] [0.028] [0.043] [0.057] [0.044]
Sponsored by family 0.070 0.045 -0.016 -0.075 -0.019 -0.045
[0.055] [0.079] [0.039] [0.058] [0.078] [0.056]
Family Visa3 -0.200*** -0.154 -0.018 0.009 -0.182* -0.028
[0.069] [0.097] [0.047] [0.071] [0.097] [0.071]
Refugee Visa3 -0.251** -0.181 -0.057 -0.122 -0.255** -0.154
[0.098] [0.122] [0.063] [0.097] [0.121] [0.099]
Occupation before dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country of Birth dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CMA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3207 3207 3207 3207 4659 4659
For OLS, standard errors clustered by CMA/CA-country cells in brackets; number of clusters is 268
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
1. Very low wages were assigned to those without wages
2 The omitted education category is Some University education but no degree
3 The omitted visa category is the Economic visa class
30Table 5: (Log) Wages, Network Size and Strength: Difference in Differences
OLS Quantile regressions
0.25 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. For ￿rst jobs within two years
Network Size -0.043 -0.024 -0.045 -0.059
[0.028] [0.057] [0.035] [0.042]
Network Strength 0.022 0.065* 0.033 0.046
[0.036] [0.036] [0.029] [0.036]
Observations 3816 3816 3816 3816
B. For ￿rst jobs within four years
Network Size -0.036 -0.028 -0.048 -0.061
[0.028] [0.059] [0.035] [0.041]
Network Strength 0.022 0.073** 0.039* 0.039
[0.038] [0.035] [0.023] [0.039]
Observations 3946 3946 3946 3946
For other explanatory variables see table 4.
Standard errors clustered by CMA/CA-country
294 clusters in panel A and 298 in panel B.
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
31Table 6: (Log) Wages, Method of Job Finding and Network Strength
OLS Quantile Regressions
0.25 0.5 0.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. For ￿rst jobs within six months
Network size -0.036 -0.041 -0.021 -0.054
[0.029] [0.057] [0.038] [0.041]
Network Strength 0.068 0.128*** 0.064** 0.052
[0.045] [0.049] [0.031] [0.044]
Network Job -0.002 0.172** 0.023 -0.031
[0.047] [0.067] [0.044] [0.061]
Network Job*Network Strength -0.032 -0.164** -0.028 -0.026
[0.053] [0.072] [0.047] [0.065]
Observations 3207 3207 3207 3207
B. For ￿rst jobs within two years
Network Size -0.042 -0.024 -0.044 -0.061
[0.028] [0.057] [0.035] [0.042]
Network Strength 0.032 0.101** 0.044 0.054
[0.045] [0.045] [0.037] [0.043]
Network Job -0.043 0.133** -0.013 -0.069
[0.049] [0.063] [0.051] [0.057]
Network Job*Network Strength -0.014 -0.142** -0.022 -0.029
[0.059] [0.067] [0.055] [0.062]
Observations 3816 3816 3816 3816
C. For ￿rst jobs within four years
Network Size -0.036 -0.028 -0.049 -0.050
[0.028] [0.059] [0.035] [0.040]
Network Strength 0.031 0.117** 0.056* 0.055
[0.047] [0.048] [0.030] [0.045]
Network Job -0.044 0.115* -0.009 -0.074
[0.050] [0.065] [0.042] [0.061]
Network Job*Network Strength -0.013 -0.129* -0.030 -0.025
[0.061] [0.070] [0.045] [0.066]
Observations 3946 3946 3946 3946
For other explanatory variables see table 4.
For OLS, standard errors clustered by CMA/CA-country
268 in panel A, 294 in panel B, 298 in panel C
* signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
32Table 7: Empirical and Simulated Parameters
Empirical Parameters Simulated
Parameters Match in Estimation
Formal Employment 0.376 0.378
Strong Network [0.007]
Formal Employment 0.437 0.426
Weak Network [0.016]
Network Employment 0.332 0.332
Strong Network [0.007]
Network Employment 0.182 0.180
Weak Network [0.012]
Network/Formal Wage Gap -0.034 -0.052
Strong Network [0.033]
Network/Formal Wage Gap -0.002 0.034
Weak Network [0.047]
25th Percentile Wage Gap 0.007 0.017
Strong Network [0.028]
25th Percentile Wage Gap 0.172 0.121
Weak Network [0.067]
Parameters Not Used in Estimation
Median gap in
Network Formal Wage Differential -0.028 -0.095
Strong Network - Weak Network (0.047)
Median Wage Gap 0.023 0.037
Weak Network [0.044]
75th Percentile gap in
Network Formal Wage Differential -0.026 -0.077
Strong Network - Weak Network (0.065)
75th Percentile Wage Gap -0.031 -0.050
Weak Network [0.061]
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